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Abstract 
Over the period between end-2009 and end-2015 Greece experienced two discernible financial crises. This 
article undertakes a correlation analysis of risk premia to investigate the nature and extent of contagion 
from these crises to other selected Euro-zone countries. A commonly expressed view is that the effects of 
the second crisis were more muted since the systemic risks were seen by markets as being lower. However, 
using a rolling correlation model, a DCC-GARCH model and a t-copula model we find that this is not the case. 
Broadly speaking, the contagion effects of the second crisis were at least as large as those associated with 
the first one.  
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I. Introduction 
A potential cost of the increasing financial integration that the Euro-zone embodies is that it may bring 
with it greater exposure for member countries to contagion from crises elsewhere in the currency area. Just 
such a threat has existed in the period since 2009 following the economic and financial crisis in Greece. A 
substantial amount of research has been undertaken that has examined the contagion effects of the crisis. 
However, this has tended to treat the crisis as one event. We contribute to this literature by arguing that there 
have been two, largely distinct, Greek crises. The second one was associated with the rise to power of the Syriza 
party in 2015. Most of the previous studies were completed before this second episode. We investigate the 
extent to which the degree and pattern of contagion differed between this crisis and the first one that had 
erupted in 2009. 
A popular view emerged at the time that the contagion effects of this second crisis would be much 
smaller since risk premia in interest rates had declined substantially and the notion that the entire Euro-zone 
would collapse had diminished. According to this view, Greece was now regarded by markets as a special case 
with only modest implications for other Euro-zone countries.  
In this paper we examine the size and effects of the two Greek crises in terms of their association with 
risk premia on government debt in other Euro-zone countries. In particular we focus on the other members of 
what was often referred to as the PIIGS group (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and compare the 
effects on them with the effects on two ‘core’ members of the Euro-zone (France and the Netherlands). Our 
specific concern is to investigate how the contagion effects of the second crisis compared with those of the first 
one. Here we use contagion in the broad sense of the term referring to the way in which effects spread from 
one country to others. We do not attempt to determine what part of this broad contagion resulted from ‘pure 
contagion’ as compared with the other forms of contagion such as ‘wake-up call contagion’ and ‘shift contagion’ 
that have been discussed in the literature (see, for example, Ludwig, 2014; Giordano et al., 2013). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies the two crises in Greece and provides a brief 
description of them. Section 3 summarizes the currently available literature on the contagion effects of crises in 
Greece and explains how we add to it. Section 4 explains the data we use and the methodology we adopt. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks that place our study in a 
broader context. 
2. Crises in Greece 
Chart 1 provides an overall picture of the long-term government bond yields of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Germany from October 19, 2009 until November 19, 2015. 
Yields had generally been stable and low up until the global financial crisis in 2007/08, averaging between 4.37 
per cent and 4.73 per cent. The situation in many Euro-zone countries including Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
deteriorated after 2009, but the most dramatic increase in yields occurred in Greece. This followed the 
revelation in October 2009 that the Greek fiscal deficit was considerably higher than had previously been 
reported. A visual inspection of Chart 1 suggests that there were two discernible crises in Greece over the period 
2009-15.  
Subsequent to the provision of an initial bail-out package in May 2010, a second package worth €246 
billion was agreed in February 2012. In March 2012, continued sovereign debt restructuring in Greece and, 
perhaps more strategically, a statement by the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, in July 
2012, that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the euro, were associated with a general reduction in 
bond yields. As indicated by Chart 1, the acute phase of the crisis seemed to be over. In April 2013, the Greek 
Parliament approved a reform bill to implement further economic reforms, and at the end of November 2013, 
Moody’s upgraded Greece’s credit rating. In May 2014, Fitch also upgraded it.  
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Chart 1. Long-Term Bond Yields of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Germany 
from October 19, 2009, to November 19, 2015. 
 
 Source: Bloomberg and Investing.com – Stock Market Quotes & Financial News 
Although Greece’s GDP growth returned to being positive in the second quarter of 2014, unemployment 
remained above 26 per cent, and there was increasing political opposition to ‘austerity’. Syriza, an anti-austerity 
party, gained popularity and, after failing to elect a new president in December 2014, the Greek parliament was 
dissolved and an election was scheduled for January 25, 2015. In his campaign, the leader of Syriza, Alexis 
Tsipras, announced that he would bring austerity to an end. With Syriza’s electoral victory there were increasing 
fears that Greece would be forced to leave the Euro-zone (Grexit). As Chart 1 reveals, there was a second 
financial crisis in Greece with yields on Greek bonds reaching a peak in July 2015. It was only after tensions 
between Greece and its creditors eased, with new austerity measures being passed by the Greek parliament as a 
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precursor to receiving the next round of bailout funds in November 2015, which the second crisis appeared to 
abate. 
 
3. Crises in Greece and Contagion: The Literature  
 
There is a large literature that deals with contagion and interdependence. This covers a wide range of 
countries, time periods and specific crises. In addition to examining interest rates, a considerable portion of the 
literature has focused on stock markets (see, for example, Bekaert et al, 2014 and Kenourgious and Dimitriou, 
2015). Many different statistical correlation techniques have been adopted in order to examine contagion, 
including dynamic conditional correlation (Engle, 2002; Chiang et al 2007), asymmetric generalized dynamic 
conditional correlations (Cappiello et al, 2006), and different copula functions (Kenourgiois et al 2011 and 
Samitas and Tsakalos, 2013). In this paper we use rolling correlations in addition to dynamic conditional 
correlations (DCC) and a copula function to examine contagion within the Euro-zone. 
There are two strands to the existing literature that are relevant to the analysis of the contagion effects 
of crises in Greece: the first relates to the underlying meaning of ‘contagion’ and its measurement; the second 
relates more specifically to the contagion associated with the events in Greece since 2009. 
There are various mechanisms through which a financial and economic crisis in one country may affect 
other countries. Some writers (for example, Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) have considered contagion to refer only 
to effects not related to fundamentals, frequently called ‘pure contagion’,  while others use the term more 
broadly to refer to increases in correlations irrespective of what causes them. In this paper we use the concept 
of contagion in a broad sense to reflect all the ways in which crises in one country may spread and affect other 
countries. It is important to note, however, that correlation does not necessarily imply contagion. A common 
shock that affects all countries in a similar way will result in relatively high correlation coefficients, but this is not 
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necessarily indicative of contagion. In the context of our study, for example, the statement by Mario Draghi in 
July 2012 is generally accepted to have had a calming effect on markets and to have reduced risk premia across 
the board. An observation that bond prices in Greece rose alongside rising bond prices in the other crisis 
countries does not therefore provide secure evidence that the reduced risk premium in Greece exerted a 
beneficial contagion effect. 
There are a number of studies that have tested for contagion in the case of the first Greek crisis. The 
results have been mixed. For example, Andenmatten and Brill (2011) examine co-movements of CDS premia in 
thirty-nine selected countries across the world between October 2008 and July 2010. Applying a bivariate test 
based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002), they report evidence of contagion. Using a DCC-GARCH model (Engle and 
Sheppard, 2001), Missio and Watzka (2011) test dynamic correlations between Greece’s risk premium and risk 
premia in five selected countries between December 31, 2008, and December 31, 2010 (Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria)1. They find that yield spreads in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Belgium 
increased along with those in Greece, but they do not offer any tests of significance.  
By separating countries into peripheral and core groups and then using a spatial panel model, Muratori 
(2014) investigates contagion among selected EMU countries over the period between January 2007 and the 
end of September 2013; contagion is once again based on the movement in ten-year government bond yield 
spreads. He reports evidence of contagion especially among peripheral countries, with there being little change 
in the magnitude of contagion over sub periods.  
In contrast to those just summarized, other studies have found more limited evidence to suggest that 
there was contagion from Greece to the other selected countries during the period of the first Greek crisis. For 
example, Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013) test for contagion by focusing on six EMU bond markets (the 
                                                          
1 The risk premia were measured as the ten-year government bond yield spreads between the selected countries and 
Germany. This is the same measurement as we use in the empirical analysis we report in the next section. 
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Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and France) from January 3, 2001, to December 31, 2012. They use 
two methodologies; a time-varying spillover regime switching model and a time-varying conditional copula 
model. While they find that bond markets in France, Germany and the Netherlands were negatively affected by 
the crisis in Greece, they find no significant contagion effect on Portugal, Italy and Spain. They conclude that 
there is no overall contagion effect.  
Pragidis et al. (2015) also look for possible contagion effects from Greece to selected Euro-zone 
countries (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) by examining ten-year Greek government bond 
yields between July 2006 and July 2012. Using a corrected dynamic conditional correlation model, they find, 
somewhat surprisingly, that the correlations between Greece and the other countries’ bond yields decreased 
after the eruption of the Greek crisis. During the crisis period, only Irish and Portuguese bond yields were 
significantly correlated with the Greek bond yield and they conclude that there was no general contagion effect.  
In this paper we seek to build on the existing literature in several ways. We investigate the contagion 
effects from Greece to other Euro-zone countries throughout the period 2009-15, and in particular examine 
whether contagion was more muted in the latter part of the period. We analyze the extent to which Euro-zone 
markets responded differently to the second crisis in 2015 than they had done to the first one. In this way we 
specifically test to see whether contagion diminished, with markets treating other Euro-zone countries as being 
better insulated from events in Greece. Following on from parts of the literature that suggest that there are 
asymmetries in the response of markets to good and bad news (Caporale et al., 2014; Beetsma et al., 2013; 
Alfonso et al., 2012) we investigate the extent to which the strength of contagion depended on whether the 
level of the risk premium in Greece was rising or falling.  
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4. Data and Methods  
Our data set consists of daily observations on 10-year government bond yields for eight Euro-zone 
countries, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, from 20th October 2009 to 
19th November 2015, covering both Greek crises to date. The difference between the 10-year government bond 
yields in each of the seven countries and the equivalent German bond yield is used as a measure of the risk 
premium. Where changes in the Greek risk premium are significantly and positively correlated with changes in 
the risk premia in the other six countries we conclude that there is prima facie evidence of contagion from 
Greece to the other Euro-zone member states.2 
Prior to estimation we pre-tested the data to ensure stationarity of the risk premium and to select the 
most important break points in the time series. Table 1 shows the set of descriptive statistics used to inform our 
statistical analysis. Column 2 shows the unit root test results based on the ADF statistics. These confirm that the 
changes in the risk premia for all six country pairs are stationary across the whole sample.  Chart 1 suggests that 
it is reasonable to place the first Greek crisis as running from 20th October 2009, when the newly elected Greek 
government revealed the true scale of the budget deficit, until 18th September 2014. We have the second Greek 
crisis as running from the 19th September 2014, when the leader of the Syriza party, Alexis Tsipras, announced 
that he was opposed to austerity and wanted to negotiate in an alliance with other peripheral Euro-zone 
countries that were in crisis, until 19th November 2015, when the Greek government passed a new austerity 
program. These perceived breaks were tested using Bai-Perron structural break tests corresponding to these 
dates and, as Table 2 shows, the null of no structural breaks is strongly rejected in each case, thus confirming the 
partition of our sample. In addition an endogenous structural break test gave a single break point on 25th July 
                                                          
2 Of course some of the observed correlations may be due to contagion from events in other countries. Here, however, we 
follow the assumptions made in most studies that causation runs primarily from Greece. While Granger causality tests were 
unable to confirm causality from Greece to the other Euro-zone members, this test is particularly unreliable in this context, 
since, with forward-looking behaviour by agents, causality may seem to run in the wrong direction. In addition, with high 
frequency data where relationships are time-varying, it is unlikely that Granger causality can even show significant bi-
directional causality.  
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2012, which corresponds exactly with Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” announcement.  Thus the partition of 
our data set has strong factual and statistical support. 
To test for contagion the risk premium of France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are 
in turn regressed on the Greek risk premium. The correlation coefficient (R), defined as 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺/𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖), 
indicates the degree of contagion, where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the effect of a one unit per cent increase of the Greek risk 
premium on each of the other i countries’ risk premia, and 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺  and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖  are respectively the standard deviations 
of the risk premium in Greece and in each of the other i countries. The importance of positive contagion is 
represented by the sign, size and statistical significance of the bilateral correlation coefficient, which is assumed 
to follow Student’s t-distribution such that: 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅/[(1− 𝑅𝑅2)/(𝑛𝑛 − 2)]1/2 where n is the sample size and the 
null hypothesis is that R is equal to zero. 
An alternative to the simple correlation coefficient is Somers' delta (d) which is a nonparametric 
measure of the strength and direction of association between an ordinal dependent and independent variables 
where both variables are monotonic. This is largely the case in our sub-samples when the risk premia are either 
rising or falling. 
One limitation associated with using simple correlations is that it implicitly assumes linearity over the 
sample. To deal with potential non-linearity in the data, we employ a rolling window technique whereby, as with 
a piecewise regression, a non-linear time series can be divided up into a number of shorter sub-samples which 
are more approximately linear. In this case correlation coefficients are computed over rolling fixed window 
lengths of 5 days and 15 days. An average of these rolling correlation coefficients gives the mean response, 
allowing for some non-linearity.   
Another potential limitation of the simple correlation coefficient is that it is based on the ordinary least 
squares residual variance being constant across the sample. In the case of non-constant error variances and 
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volatility clustering, whereby large changes in the risk premium follow large changes and smaller changes follow 
small changes, Engle (1982) suggested an ARCH model in which the estimated residual variance is subject to 
time-varying conditional heteroskedasticity. This multivariate GARCH model has the effect of allowing for some 
non-linearity between the Greek and the other Euro-zone members’ risk premium. From the earlier definition of 
R, intuitively if 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺 and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 vary over the sample then 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 will also vary over the sample. The dynamic conditional 
correlation model of Engle (2002) not only achieves a large reduction in the number of parameters by specifying 
univariate conditional GARCH variances 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2   but also generates parsimonious conditional correlation series, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
for each country pair and the average conditional correlation statistic (DCC)3.   
 Our final correlation test is Student’s t-copula. The advantage of a copula is that it is more flexible 
because it allows the fitting of the dependence structure of the time series separately from the marginal 
distribution, which means that different marginal distributions can be fitted to different variables.  So given two 
random variables X and Y with continuous marginal functions ( )xF x  and ( )yF y , the Sklar Theorem (Sklar, 
1959) states that the joint distribution function ( , )F x y can be written in the form of a copula function , C , such 
that ( , ) ( ( ), ( ))x yF x y C F x F y= . Therefore the function is the copula of ( , )F x y and the distribution is coupled 
with the marginal distributions ( )xF x  and ( )yF y . Thus a copula is a way of representing the dependence 
structure between X and Y.  There are, however, a very large number of potential distributions which can be 
selected; in this paper we chose the bivariate, student t-distribution.  This has the advantage of being able to 
capture high kurtosis, which is present in our data, as shown in Table 1, where the risk premium for all countries 
exhibits kurtosis. Thus the marginal distributions for changes in the risk premia of Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
France have heavy tails to the left, while Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands have heavy tails to the right. The 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test also suggests that we can strongly reject the hypothesis that all variables are 
                                                          
3 As noted by Caporin and McAleer (2013), there are no robust significance tests for this statistic.  
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normally distributed. In sum, while normal distribution appears not to be the appropriate marginal distribution 
for our data, the student-t distribution does seem to be an appropriate marginal distribution4.  
 
5. Results, Discussion and Interpretation 
5.1 Correlations across countries and the two crisis periods 
Over the periods of both crises, changes in the market's perception of risks in Greece, as reflected by 
changes in Greek risk premia, had a positive, statistically significant and often large effect on risk premia 
elsewhere in the Euro-zone. We use both a 5-day and a 15-day rolling window, and calculate simple correlation 
coefficients as well as the DCCs.  As shown in Table 3, during both of the crises the 15-day window yielded 
higher correlations than the 5-day one, although the differences were not large. For the first period, the DCC 
estimates lay between the two rolling window ones, while the t-copula statistics were the largest for all 
countries (except Ireland on the 15-day window).  For the second crisis, however, the DCC estimates were 
consistently below the estimates using both the 5 and 15-day windows, although the copula correlation 
measure was the largest for every country, except France.  All four methods show approximately the same 
patterns. During both the first and second crises the correlations for the four other PIIGS are quite similar. There 
appears to have been little differentiation among them5. The correlations were substantial, typically falling in 
the range of 0.3 to 0.4, although the copula measures were marginally higher in a range of 0.4-0.5. 
 Generally the differences between the same types of correlations across the two periods were small, 
with the exception that the 5 and 15-day rolling window correlation statistics tended to be somewhat higher 
during the second crisis for the 5 and 15-day windows.  Both the 5-day and the 15-day windows, as well as the 
                                                          
4 The large, negative skewness on the Greek risk premium is a potential problem because the t-distribution is a symmetric 
distribution. However, as Cherubini et al (2004) point out a non-central Student t can be used to allow for negative 
skewness; in large samples this seems to make little significant difference to the marginal estimation.  
5 We take the finding that there is little differentiation among the correlations for the other countries as providing some 
support for our assumption that the shocks came mainly from Greece.  
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copula measures of correlation, showed a substantial increase for Portugal in the second period, although the 
DCC estimates showed little change. This is confirmed by Chart 2, which plots the dynamic DCC statistics for 
each country relative to Greece over the whole sample. In addition, chart 2 shows that the time-varying pattern 
of changes in the risk premia of the PIIGS was very similar across the sample. In general, there was no 
consistency across the methods as to which countries had the largest changes.  
A second important finding is that while, as expected, the two core countries in our sample, France and 
the Netherlands, had much smaller correlations than the crisis countries, as shown in Chart 2, these correlations 
were also significant and fairly large; the range was between 0.10 to 0.30, with most observations falling 
between 0.20 to 0.28. The correlations suggest that the Netherlands may have been slightly less affected than 
France during the first crisis with almost no difference during the second one. Likewise, there is little difference 
in the estimates between the first and second crises, except for the 5-day window in the case of the 
Netherlands. This showed a substantial increase during the second crisis from what was a very low estimate 
during the first one.  
Given the range of economic circumstances in the other countries we selected, the observed 
correlations seem likely to reflect broad contagion as we have defined it, and a causal connection running 
primarily from Greece to the other countries rather than reverse causation. It also seems unlikely that the 
significant co-movement of risk premia over the entire period can be adequately explained by a series of 
common external shocks, although this sometimes may have been a factor, such as in the case of Draghi’s 
statement in support of the Euro in July, 2012 which resulted in a general decline in risk premia. The argument 
that by the time of the second Greek crisis other Euro-zone countries had been able to largely isolate 
themselves in the eyes of the markets from events in Greece and eradicate or substantially reduce contagion is 
not supported by our evidence. This may be partly because the underlying institutional structure of the Euro-
zone did not change between the two crises.  While some defensive measures have been taken, most of the 
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fundamental changes that have been recommended by many experts as needed in order for the Euro-zone to 
operate effectively have faced strong political opposition from countries such as Germany (see Bergsten, 2012, 
Bird, 2012, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016, and Brunnermeier et al. 2016). With little prospect of such reform 
and with banking systems that have been insufficiently strengthened, it is unsurprising that financial markets 
continue to regard the Euro-zone as fragile. 
As compared with the entire span of the first crisis from October, 2009 to September, 2014, it appears 
that, for our selected countries and based on the rolling window Pearson correlation coefficients as well as the t-
copula measures in Table 3, the contagion from the second Greek crisis was either a little or much larger. It was 
no lower for any of the countries in our sample, and it is only in Italy, and then only in the case of the 15-day 
rolling window correlation, that there was no change between the correlation coefficients across the two crises. 
Table 3 also provides evidence to show that the differences were statistically significant in the cases of Portugal, 
France and the Netherlands. Interestingly the increases in contagion as between the two crises are largest in the 
case of one core country (the Netherlands) and one periphery country (Portugal). By contrast the DCC and 
copula estimates paint a somewhat different picture about the relative sizes of the correlations between the 
first and second crises. For these, all of the other PIIGS countries showed declines ranging from 0.01 to 0.08 on 
the DCC measure but an increase on the copula measure of between 0.03 and 0.06. For France and the 
Netherlands both DCC and copula measures show a small increase. 
While we believe these contrasting results show the importance of checking the robustness of results 
using multiple methods, we also believe that there is adequate evidence across the methods to support the 
argument that there were not large differences in the correlations among the other crisis countries during the 
first and second Greek crises and that the core countries also faced sizeable contagion. The claim that contagion 
was relatively unimportant during the second Greek crisis is not supported by our evidence.  
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5.2 Contagion during periods of rising and falling risk: Were there asymmetries? 
In this sub-section we briefly examine the extent to which responses to increasing and decreasing risk 
premia in Greece were symmetrical or asymmetrical. Table 4 distinguishes between periods when risk premia 
were generally rising and when they were generally falling.  Consistent with the behavioral finance approach 
(see, for example, Bird et al, 2017), during the first crisis both the 5 and 15-day windows show higher 
correlations during periods when the risk premium in Greece was rising than when it was falling (with the 
exception of Portugal). The differences are fairly substantial with most differences in the range of 0.06 to 0.08 
against average correlations in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 for the crisis countries. Once again, however, the 
differences using the DCC and copula measures are much smaller and Portugal shows higher correlations during 
the periods of falling risk premia. 
For the period of the second crisis in Greece there is a consistent pattern for Portugal, Italy, Ireland and 
Spain that reveals higher correlations during times when risk premia were rising. The differences are often fairly 
substantial, and exist irrespective of the statistical methodology used; they are the largest for the copula 
measure ranging from 0.13 to 0.22.  For the core countries, France and the Netherlands, the results are mixed. 
The 5 and 15-day windows show higher correlations during the periods when risk premia were falling, while the 
DCC and copula estimates show the opposite. Somers’ delta correlation analysis, show the same general 
patterns as the other measures for the second crisis period but reveal no substantial asymmetry during the first 
crisis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Whereas a popular view is that there was little contagion from the second Greek crisis as compared with 
the first one, we find that there was considerable contagion, broadly defined, during both crises, and that the 
contagion during the second crisis was at least of the same order of magnitude as during the first one; Pearson 
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rolling window correlations and copulas suggest stronger contagion from the second Greek crisis. The notion 
that core countries became largely exempt from contagion by the time of the second Greek crisis is not 
supported by the evidence. While less than for the crisis countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain), France and 
the Netherlands also faced substantial contagion during both crises. For the other crisis countries, contagion 
from the second Greek crisis was little different from that associated with the first Greek crisis. These findings 
suggest that although the two crises were generated by different types of events, the resulting contagion was 
not too dissimilar. This in turn implies that a common underlying factor, such as the perceived deficiencies in the 
institutional structure of the Euro-zone, may have contributed to contagion.  The persistence of national 
macroeconomic imbalances across members of the Euro-zone, along with continuing weaknesses within many 
national banking systems make the Euro-zone fragile and susceptible to contagion from crises. 
While our analysis establishes some important broad facts about the patterns of contagion during the 
two Greek crises, further research could seek to differentiate between the various types of contagion and could 
break down the crises into further sub periods. It could also distinguish between common and country-specific 
shocks as well as the degree of rational versus irrational contagion. Our preliminary examination of periods of 
rising and falling risk premia suggests that during the Greek crises, and in particular during the second one, some 
behavioural influences, such as excessive pessimism and confirmation bias, may have been at work. However, 
the data are not consistent with the claim that markets were highly irrational.6 
While in this paper we only compare the first and second Greek crises and periods of rising and falling 
risk premia, there may well be substantial differences in behavior across different sub phases of the crises. 
Preliminary work we have done, but which we do not report in this paper, suggests this is indeed the case. For 
                                                          
6 Markets may still have deviated substantially from efficiency in other dimensions. There is very strong evidence that they 
underpriced risk before the crisis and some studies have concluded that markets over priced risk during the crisis. See for 
example Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Bird et al., 2016; Gibson et al., 2012, 2014. 
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example, contagion appears to have been stronger in the early phase of the second Greek crisis than in the later 
phase. This is an area of research that warrants further investigation.  
The results reported in this paper offer few grounds for believing that contagion from crises in Greece 
(and elsewhere in the Euro-zone) are a thing of the past, or that Euro-zone governments and EU bodies will 
develop sufficiently cohesive institutions and policies for dealing effectively with future crises should they occur.  
One key issue has been the failure (up to the point of writing) to reach agreement on the restructuring of Greek 
debt, in spite of the IMF’s belief that it remains unsustainable. Another one relates to the continuing 
weaknesses of several national banking systems. Although Euro-zone governments have declared that there will 
be no further public bailouts of banks, markets may question the credibility of such commitments. Banking 
crises could then still be perceived as potentially feeding back adversely on countries' fiscal positions. Further 
crises in markets for both government and private sector debt remain a distinct possibility. The evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that such crises may continue to have significant contagion effects across much 
of the Euro-zone. 
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Table 1. Supremum Wald Test for Structural Breaks7. 
Dates 8-Mar-12 26-Jul-12 19-Sep-14 19-Nov-15 
Χ2 11.43*** 24.91*** 6.95** 8.76** 
 Note: *** and ** indicate the significant levels of 1% and 5% respectively. Ho: there is no structural 
 break on the specified dates. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample period  
 
Change in risk 
premium  ADF 
Mean 
(in bps) Std.Dev Kurtosis Skewness Normality 
Greece −52.30*** 0.344 0.72 378.46 -13.68 0.84***  
Ireland −31.37*** -0.062 0.13 19.27 -0.20 0.89***  
Portugal −33.38*** 0.090 0.20 34.04 0.83 0.89***  
spain −33.88*** 0.041 0.11 10.47 -0.33 0.94***  
Italy −35.09*** 0.020 0.10 10.90 0.16 0.90***  
France −33.24*** 0.002 0.04 9.92 -0.03 0.84***  
Netherlands −39.28*** -0.009 0.02 12.94 0.71 0.98***  
Note: *** indicates the significant level of 1%. ADF, Ho: the variable exhibits a unit root and Shapiro-Wilk 
 W-test for normality Ho: the variable is normally distributed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 As illustrated in Chart 1 in the paper, 8-Mar-12 indicates the end of the rising period in the first Greek crisis; 26-
Jul-12 indicates the beginning of the falling period in the first Greek crisis; 19-Sep-14 indicates the beginning of 
the second Greek crisis; 19-Nov-15 indicates the end of the rising period as well as the beginning of the falling 
period in the second Greek crisis. 
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Table 3. Correlations between Changes’ in Risk Premia of Greece and the Other Selected Countries in the First and the Second Greek Crisis. 
  
1st crisis 2nd crisis difference between  the 1st and 2nd crisis (in abs) 
5-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
15-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
DCC 
(mean) t-copula 
5-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
15-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
DCC 
(mean) t-copula 
5-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
15-day 
rolling 
window 
(mean) R 
DCC 
(mean) t-copula 
Ireland 0.34** 0.41*** 0.37 0.39*** 0.36** 0.42** 0.31 0.43*** 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.04 
Portugal 0.28** 0.36*** 0.33 0.43*** 0.40** 0.46** 0.32 0.49*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.06 
Spain 0.33** 0.39*** 0.37 0.40*** 0.34** 0.40** 0.30 0.44*** 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 
Italy 0.30** 0.39*** 0.36 0.40*** 0.34** 0.39** 0.28 0.43*** 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.03 
France 0.19** 0.26*** 0.19 0.26*** 0.26** 0.30** 0.20 0.28*** 0.07** 0.04** 0.01 0.02 
Netherlands 0.09** 0.18*** 0.14 0.19*** 0.25** 0.26** 0.24 0.28*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.10 0.09 
Note: *** and ** indicate the significant levels of 1% and 5% respectively. 
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Table 4. Correlations between Changes’ in Risk Premia of Greece and the Other Selected Countries in the First and the Second Greek Crisis in the 
Rising and Falling Periods. 
 
 
Note: *** and ** indicate the significant levels of 1% and 5% respectively. 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st crisis 
5-day rolling 
window (mean) R 
15-day rolling 
window (mean) R DCC (mean) Somers' d t-copula 
Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling 
Ireland 0.38** 0.34** 0.45** 0.40** 0.40 0.36 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 
Portugal 0.28** 0.32** 0.36** 0.42*** 0.32 0.38 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 
Spain 0.39** 0.30** 0.45** 0.37*** 0.41 0.35 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 
Italy 0.35** 0.29** 0.44** 0.37*** 0.39 0.36 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 
France 0.24** 0.17** 0.30** 0.24** 0.21 0.20 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
Netherlands 0.13** 0.06** 0.22** 0.14** 0.15 0.15 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 
2nd crisis 
5-day rolling 
window (mean) R 
15-day rolling 
window (mean) R DCC (mean) Somers' d t-copula 
Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling Rising Falling 
Ireland 0.36** 0.35** 0.41** 0.44** 0.33 0.28 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.48*** 0.26** 
Portugal 0.41** 0.38** 0.48** 0.39** 0.35 0.26 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 
Spain 0.36** 0.27* 0.44** 0.27** 0.32 0.26 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.49*** 0.36*** 
Italy 0.35** 0.30** 0.43** 0.30** 0.31 0.21 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.48*** 0.31*** 
France 0.25** 0.29** 0.28** 0.33** 0.22 0.18 0.18*** 0.19** 0.30*** 0.21* 
Netherlands 0.22** 0.30* 0.25** 0.27** 0.24 0.23 0.20*** 0.15** 0.32*** 0.17* 
23 
 
 
 
Chart 2. Dynamic Conditional Correlations between Greece and the Other Sample Countries during the Entire Sample Period.  
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